Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law
Volume 11 | Issue 1

Article 6

2002

Adjudication According to Codes of Judicial
Conduct
Jennifer Gerarda Brown

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl
Part of the Sexuality and the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Brown, Jennifer Gerada. "Adjudication According to Codes of Judicial Conduct." American University Journal of Gender Social Policy
and Law 11, no. 1 (2002): 67-83.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact fbrown@wcl.american.edu.

Brown: Adjudication According to Codes of Judicial Conduct
ADJUDICATION ACCORDING T O C ODES O F JUDICIAL C ONDUCT

11/20/02 4:14 PM

ADJUDICATION ACCORDING TO
CODES OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
JENNIFER G ERARDA BROWN *

INTRODUCTION
This symposium explores the problem of sexual orientation bias in
the court system. My thesis is that we can find one solution to this
problem in the codes of judicial conduct, the rules judges adopt to
govern their own behavior. In many states, these codes already
provide a framework to deter and punish judges who manifest sexual
1
orientation bias. Canon 3 of the American Bar Association Code of
Judicial Conduct provides that  [a] judge shall not, in the
performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias or
2
prejudice . . . based upon . . . sexual orientation. I have argued that
judges manifest bias on the basis of sexual orientation and thereby
violate Canon 3 when they engage in three kinds of behavior:
1. They use disrespectful words or phrases to refer to gay men,
lesbians, and homosexuality in general;
2. They exhibit  positive bias by finding facts in ways distorted by
*

Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law; Visiting Lecturer and
Senior Research Scholar, Yale Law School.
1. See, e.g., C AL . C ODE OF J UD . E THICS Canon 3(B)(5) (2000) (prohibiting a judge
from manifesting bias or prejudice based upon sexual orientation); MISS. C ODE OF
JUD . C ONDUCT Canon 3(B)(5) (2002) (requiring a judge to refrain from exhibiting
sexual orientation bias in the performance of judicial duties).
2. See MODEL C ODE OF J UD . C ONDUCT Canon 3(B)(5) (2000) [hereinafter Canon
3]. Canon 3(B)(5), entitled  Adjudicative Responsibilities, provides:
A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. A judge shall
not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct manifest bias
or prejudice, including but not limited to bias or prejudice based upon race,
sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or
socioeconomic status, and shall not permit staff, court officials and others
subject to the judges direction and control to do so.
Id.; see also id. at cmt. ( A judge who manifests bias on any basis in a proceeding
impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into disrepute. ).
Although Canon 3 is extensive and covers many aspects of adjudicative and
administrative duties, this Article will use the phrase  Canon 3 to refer specifically
to the anti-bias provision set forth above. Id.

67
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assumptions or stereotypes about gays;
3. They exhibit  normative bias in contexts where they have
discretion in making or applying law by engaging in de jure
3
disparate treatment on the basis of sexual orientation.
Some would argue that bias includes only the first category 
disrespect and some small portion of the second evidentiary
error.4 I persist in my view, however, that a more capacious reading
of Canon 3 is necessary to safeguard the integrity of the courts and
protect litigants who have traditionally been marginalized by the
system.
It is vitally important that we understand the reach of Canon 3 to
include the process of adjudication and the substantive decisions of
judges. Civility and respect are important, of course, but they are the
very least that lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender ( LGBT )
litigants should expect from the court system. If Canon 3 merely
reminds judges of their manners, it is a very weak instrument indeed.
To ensure fairness and do justice, an anti-bias provision such as
Canon 3 must go further. It must reach substantive decisionmaking for that is where true injustice occurs. Contrary to the
5
traditional childrens rhyme, words can hurt; no litigant should have
to endure ridicule or humiliation as the price of justice.
Furthermore, when the production site for the  sticks and stones of
litigation is adjudication, the LGBT litigant quickly realizes how
lasting the damage from resulting bias can be. A polite, respectful
judge can be biased on the basis of sexual orientation. That bias will
be manifest not in courtroom demeanor, but in the heart of the
judges work: ruling on evidence, making findings of fact, reading
and applying precedent, and interpreting statutes. Shall we read
Canon 3 to sit idly by while bias is manifest in these judicial actions?
Such a reading ignores the judiciarys responsibility to ensure
procedural and substantive fairness for the people who seek redress
in the courts. When referring to the judges  duties, Canon 3
6
discusses both  administrative and  adjudicative responsibilities.
These are the duties that judges must perform  without bias or

3. Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Sweeping Reform from Small Rules? Anti-bias Canons as
a Substitute for Heightened Scrutiny, 85 MINN . L. R EV. 363, 370 (2000).
4. See William C. Duncan, Sexual Orientation Bias: The Substantive Limits of Ethics
Rules, 11 AM. U. J. OF G ENDER S OC. POLY & L. 85, 90-91 (2002) (counseling a very
narrow reading of Canon 3).
5. For those who have not heard this rhyme in a while, heres a reminder:
 sticks and stones can break my bones but words will never hurt me.
6. MODEL C ODE OF J UD . C ONDUCT Canon 3(B)-(C).

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol11/iss1/6

2

Brown: Adjudication According to Codes of Judicial Conduct
ADJUDICATION ACCORDING T O C ODES O F JUDICIAL C ONDUCT

2002]

11/20/02 4:14 PM

ADJUDICATION AND C ODES OF JUDICIAL C ONDUCT

69

7

The very wording of Canon 3 militates against the
prejudice.
argument that the anti-bias provision should function as little more
8
than a rule of civility.
Let me be clear, however. The reach of Canon 3 is not without
structural or political limitation. Indeed, the Code of Judicial
Conduct states that it  should be applied consistent with
constitutional requirements, statutes, other court rules and decisional
9
law and in the context of all relevant circumstances. My argument
has never been that Canon 3 can amend state or federal
constitutions, overturn binding precedent, or justify a subversion of
the legislative process. I have acknowledged that Canon 3 governs
only the courts, and cannot reach the legislative or executive
10
branches of government. Thus, a judge does not violate Canon 3 by
ruling against LGBT litigants on the basis of sexual orientation when
two conditions are met: (1) the ruling is compelled by superior law
11
and (2) the superior law is also clearly anti-gay. If applicable law
whether statute, regulation, or court case is both clearly anti-gay and
binding, a judge citing that law to rule against a gay or lesbian litigant
should not fear discipline under Canon 3.
Consider, though, how many cases occur in which one or both of
these conditions are not met. Judges sometimes rule on the basis of
12
sexual orientation, citing law that is not binding upon them. At
other times, they rule against LGBT litigants on the basis of sexual
13
orientation, citing law that is not clearly anti-gay. Judges cannot
blame the law for the anti-gay results in these two categories of cases;
the judges themselves must bear the responsibility. In some cases,
vital moments arrive in which judges can choose whether or not they
will use sexual orientation just that characteristic, standing alone
 to affect a litigant negatively. In these moments of choice, Canon
3 is activated to guide judges to a position of neutrality with respect to
that characteristic.

7. MODEL C ODE OF J UD . C ONDUCT Canon 3(B)(5).
8. See id. ( A judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice. )

(emphasis added).
9. MODEL C ODE OF J UD . C ONDUCT pmbl.
10. See generally id. (establishing that the Code of Judicial Conduct sets standards
for ethical conduct of judges).
11. See Brown, supra note 3, at 417.
12. See id. at 428-30 (indicating some judges misuse stare decisis as a form of
judicial bias and subtle discrimination).
13. See id. at 419-28 (discussing that in most cases, judges reveal their biases by
interjecting the issue of sexual orientation into statutes that have neutral standards).
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C ANON 3 R EQUIRES N EUTRALITY IN D EMEANOR , F ACT -F INDING ,
AND INTERPRETATION OF L AW

Neutrality requires judges to refrain from inflammatory rhetoric
that is denigrating to gay litigants and their relationships. Using
14
15
16
words or phrases like  homo,  queer[],  buggery,  Sodom
17
18
and Gomorrah, or  sick situation to describe LGBT litigants and
their families clearly manifests bias on the basis of sexual orientation.
Most people seem to agree that judges using such offensive language
should be subject to discipline, but the proposition would not get
unanimous approval.
In the spring of 2002, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc. and Equality Mississippi, two gay rights advocacy organizations,
filed a grievance against Mississippi Judge Connie Glenn Wilkerson in
response to a letter he wrote to the editor of the George County Times,
19
published March 28, 2002. The letter stated that  gays and lesbians
should be put in some type of a mental institute, objected to
legislation that advances civil rights for lesbian and gay people, and
further stated that elected officials who support such legislation (as
well as the citizens who vote for those officials)  have to stand in the
20
judgment of GOD.
Interestingly enough, only a week later,
Mississippi amended its Code of Judicial Conduct to join the majority
of states that specifically prohibit expressions of bias on the basis of
14. District Court Judge Oliver Gasch referred to a gay plaintiff as a  homo and
other gay men as  homos. See Steffan v. Cheney, No. 88-3369 (OG), 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 4852, at *10 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 1991) (mem.), affd on rehg en banc sub nom.
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
15. See In re Hampton, 775 S.W.2d 629, 630 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam) (discussing
a filing seeking removal of a judge who made comments such as,  I dont care much
for queers running around on the weekends picking up teenage boys, as reported
in the Dallas Times Herald on December 16, 1988).
16. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 285 (N.J. 1998) (comparing the
lower courts analysis of  sodomy and  buggery with the Boy Scouts religious and
moral foundation).
17. See, e.g., id. (discussing the trial judges description of the  Judeo-Christian
tradition condemning sodomy when the trial judge held that a homosexual scout
leader would be adverse to the  morally straight goals of the Boy Scouts of
America).
18. See Rucks v. State, 692 So. 2d 976, 977 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (referring,
apparently, to lesbian litigants household or relationship with another woman as a
 sick situation ).
19. The full text of Judge Wilkersons letter to the editor is reprinted in the
Complaint to the Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance. See C OMPLAINT
TO THE MISSISSIPPI C OMMISSION ON J UDICIAL PERFORMANCE AGAINST G EORGE C OUNTY
JUSTICE C OURT JUDGE C ONNIE G LENN WILKERSON 1-2 (Apr. 8, 2002) [hereinafter
WILKERSON C OMPLAINT], available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/binary-data/
LAMBDA_PDF/pdf/128.pdf.
20. See id.
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sexual orientation. On April 9, 2002, only days after the Mississippi
Supreme Court formally prohibited sexual orientation bias, Judge
Wilkerson told an interviewer for Mississippi Public Radio that gay
22
men and lesbians are  sick.
In the winter of 2002, Alabama Supreme Court Chief Justice Roy
Moore similarly gave vent to his feelings about homosexuality and
managed, in a single concurring opinion, to exhibit all three kinds of
sexual orientation bias: disrespect, positive bias, and normative bias.
In this case, a California couple with three young children divorced
23
in 1992, and the mother was awarded primary physical custody.
Four years later, the mother petitioned a California court for custody
modification, asking that the father receive physical custody of the
24
children, though he had moved to Alabama in the interim. The
25
reasons for this change are not entirely clear, but the Alabama
Supreme Court refers to the fact that change in custody occurred
26
after the mother had begun a  homosexual relationship. At other
points in the opinion, the mother is described as a recovering
27
alcoholic, which suggests that her alcoholism may have played a role
in the custody change of 1996. In 1999, the mother filed again in
28
California requesting that physical custody be returned to her. The
father resisted and the case was transferred to Alabama, where the
29
three children resided.
In June of 2000, the Alabama trial court held a two-day hearing at
which it heard oral testimony, including testimony by the two
younger children, who were thirteen and fifteen years old at the
21. See In the Matter of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct, Order (Apr. 4,
2002), available at http://www.mssc.state.ms.us/news/sn94835.pdf; see also MISS.
C ODE OF JUD . C ONDUCT Canon 3(B)(5)-(6) (2002) (requiring both judges and
lawyers to refrain from discriminatory language or conduct during judicial
proceedings).
22. See WILKERSON C OMPLAINT , supra note 19, at 4-5 (describing Judge Wilkersons
extrajudicial activities in public as demeaning).
23. See Ex parte H.H., No. 1002045, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 44, at *1 (Feb. 15, 2002).
24. Id. at *1-*2.
25. The mother, Dawn Huber, has since told reporters that she petitioned for the
change in custody at the request of her children, who were twelve, eleven and nine
years old at the time. See Leon Drouin Keith, Lesbian Mother in Alabama Custody Case
Mulls Appeal, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 28, 2002, available at http://www.sodomylaws.org/
usa/alabama/alnews20.htm.
26. Ex parte H.H., 2002 Ala. LEXIS 44, at *1-*2.
27. According to the trial court, the father argued that the mother was  an
alcoholic lesbian. Id. at *6. The court of appeals noted that the mother  was now
sober. Id. at *8.
28. See id. at *2; see also Keith, supra note 25 (relating that the petition for change
of custody was at the request of the children, according to the mother).
29. See Ex parte H.H., 2002 Ala. LEXIS 44, at *2.
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time. The trial court developed a record filled with information
31
about modes of punishment used by the father, the childrens
32
performance in school, attempts by the father to limit or monitor
33
the childrens communication with their mother, worries about the
34
eldest childs sexual activity and health care, and the childrens
35
feelings about their father and stepmother.
Though the record from this hearing was presumably voluminous,
the trial courts written findings of fact, as summarized by the
36
Alabama Supreme Court, were sparse. The trial court paraphrased
each parents accusations about the other (mother: the father is  a
domestic abuser ; father: the mother is an  alcoholic lesbian ) and
stated that  it can be no surprise that these children have serious
37
issues in their lives. The trial court denied the mothers petition
for a change in custody, finding that the mother had failed to prove a
material change in circumstances or otherwise show that  the change
in custody will materially promote the childs best interests, and that
the benefits of the change will offset the disruptive effect caused by
uprooting the child. 38
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that the
mother had presented substantial evidence that  a change in custody
39
would materially promote the childrens best interest and welfare.
40
The father sought certiorari review in the Alabama Supreme Court.
The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
30. See id.
31. See id. at *3-*4 (including such violent acts as slapping, whipping, kicking,
and requiring the sons to sit with paper bags on their heads as punishment).
32. See id. at *4 (explaining the mothers claims that the childrens grades had
dropped since the children started living with their father).
33. See id. at *4-*5 ( [F]ather was denying the children the ability to contact
[their mother] by tape-recording their telephone calls to the mother and preventing
them from using E-mail . . .  ).
34. See id. at *5 (indicating first the mothers fears that the sexually active
daughter had not been to a gynecologist and second, that the daughter had denied
she was sexually active when apparently confronted by the father).
35. See id. (highlighting testimony from two of the children, one stating that the
father was  too strict and the other stating that the stepmother had  taken over
the childs computer).
36. See id. at *6-*7.
37. Id. at *6.
38. Id. (citing Ex parte McLendon, 455 So. 2d 863, 865 (Ala. 1984) (holding that a
party seeking a custody modification must show that the change in custody would
promote the childs best interest and that the benefits of the change justify any
disruptive effect)).
39. Id. at *7.
40. See id. at *8.
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41

reinstated the order of the trial court. Given the media attention
focused on this case and the inflammatory language of Justice Roy
Moores concurring opinion, it is important to focus with some
precision on what the majority of the Alabama Supreme Court did or
42
did not say in its opinion. Whatever Chief Justice Moore or the
43
Associated Press may suggest, it is important to note that nowhere in
the majority opinion does the author, Justice Houston, argue that the
trial court was entitled to reject the mothers bid for testimony based
solely on her sexual orientation.
Indeed, Justice Houston seems to reject the opportunity to discuss
homosexuality in any significant way. The majority opinion contains
exactly five references to the mothers lesbianism: three of these
44
appear in the summary of the trial courts findings and one appears
45
in the summary of the appellate courts ruling. Only once does the
majority opinion independently refer to the mothers sexual
orientation; this occurs near the beginning of the opinion as Justice
Houston sets forth the factual and procedural chronology of the case:
41. See id. at *7.
42. See id. at *16 (Moore, C.J., concurring). Moore inaccurately states that the
majority opinion is  upholding the trial courts ore tenus finding and Alabama
precedent, which holds that homosexual conduct by a parent is inherently
detrimental to children. Id. While it is true that the majority upholds the ore tenus
finding below, the majority never endorses the Alabama precedent to which Chief
Justice Moore refers.
43. See Phillip Rawls, Judge Calls Homosexuality Evil in Alabama Court Decision,
ASSOC. PRESS, Feb. 15, 2002 (suggesting inaccurately that Moores anti-gay language
appears in the  unanimous decision by the court), available at http://www.agrnews.
org/issues/162/nationalnews.html; Chief Justice Roy Moore Speaks Out on Gays, ASSOC.
PRESS, Mar. 24, 2002 (on file with American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy &
the Law) ( Moore described homosexuality as abhorrent, immoral, detestable in a
unanimous Alabama Supreme Court ruling last month denying a lesbian mother
custody of her three children ). It is interesting to speculate about why reporters
would enhance the anti-gay image of Ex parte H.H. Perhaps, as one colleague of
mine suggested, this is yet another example of the  liberal media fanning the flames
of the culture wars. If so, I fear that the strategy can backfire. It is easy to
overestimate the breadth and intensity of hostility toward LGBT people, and
presenting Ex parte H.H. as a unanimously anti-gay opinion facilitates such views. If
the emphasis were instead put on the neutrality of the majority opinion, even in the
face of Moores anti-gay screed, a saner sort of discourse might emerge. And the
millions of Americans who find themselves in the persuadable middle of this
particular culture war could take from the majoritys neutrality an example for more
progressive behavior.
44. See Ex parte H.H., 2002 Ala. LEXIS 44, at *4-*6. The majority quotes the
following trial court findings referencing the mothers lesbianism: (1)  The record
indicates that . . . all the childrens grades fell after the mother started her
homosexual relationship, id. at *4; (2)  The [father] says the [mother] is an
alcoholic lesbian, id. at *6; and (3)  while not . . . condoning the [mothers]
lifestyle, this Court cannot rewrite the lives of the parties or [the] children. Id.
45. See id. at *8 ( The Court of Civil Appeals also held that . . . there was no
evidence indicating her homosexual relationship would have a detrimental effect on
the well-being of the children. ).
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 In 1996, after the mother had begun a homosexual relationship, she
petitioned a California court for a custody modification, asking that
46
the father . . . be awarded physical custody of the children.
The majoritys reasoning that is, the stated basis for its decision
to reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the order of the trial
47
The majority
court focuses entirely upon a procedural point.
opinion stands for the rather unremarkable proposition that an
appellate court should not reweigh oral testimony, because the trial
judge (who, after all, is the one who actually saw the witnesses and
48
heard their testimony) is in the better position to assess it. The result
of Ex parte H.H. is certainly regrettable; a lesbian mother has failed to
regain custody of her children because she was unable to persuade a
49
court that circumstances merited the change. The holding of Ex
parte H.H., on the other hand, is less troubling. From the perspective
of those of us who wish to eliminate sexual orientation bias in the
courts, the majority opinion in Ex parte H.H. might even be a cause
for mild celebration.
Celebrating the Ex parte H.H. case may strike some readers as
50
weirdly Pollyanna-esque, but consider the context. The context is
Alabama, where consensual sex between people of the same sex
51
remains a criminal act, where the state legislature has adopted an
52
anti-marriage statute denying recognition to marriages celebrated in
46. Id. at *1-*2.
47. See id. at *11 (reversing the appellate courts holding that the trial courts

judgment was unsupported by the evidence).
48. See id. at *10 ( We hold that the Court of Civil Appeals impermissibly
reweighed the evidence in this case. ).
49. See id. at *6 (citing Ex parte McLendon in noting that the mother had failed to
prove material change in circumstances such that the  benefits of the change in
custody [would] offset the disruptive effect caused by uprooting the children).
50. Some might protest that Im not just seeing a glass half full rather than half
empty. I am, as the old joke goes, responding to a gift of manure by asking  Great!
Wheres my pony?
51. ALA. C ODE § 13A-6-65 (1975).
52. In the wake of the Hawaii Supreme Courts opinion in Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993) (ruling that the states marriage laws discriminate on the
basis of gender and must be justified by a compelling state interest), rehg granted in
part, 875 P.2d 225 (Haw. 1993), affd sub nom. Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw.
1997), people in other parts of the country feared that Hawaii would begin to marry
couples of the same sex and  export those marriages to other states. See Grant S.
Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause: Applying First Principles
to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State Control Over Social Issues, 85
IOWA L. R EV. 1, 170 (1999) (noting that as a result of the Hawaii Supreme Courts
holding in Baehr, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act ( DOMA ), which
stated that no state is required to recognize any same-sex marriage legalized in
another state). To forestall the anticipated spread of same-sex marriage, many states
enacted  mini-DOMAs, declaring that they would not recognize any marriage
celebrated between people of the same sex. See, e.g., G A. C ODE ANN . § 19-3-3.1 (1996)
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53

other states between people of the same sex, where as recently as
1998 the state supreme court declared that homosexuality is  illegal
under the laws of this state and immoral in the eyes of most of its
54
citizens, and where (let us not forget) the Canons of Judicial Ethics
prohibit bias or prejudice but do not specifically mention sexual
55
orientation bias. In this context, in a custody dispute involving a
lesbian mother, the state supreme court majority opinion purports to
56
rule on purely procedural grounds. This strikes me as progress. To
put this point more concretely, imagine future opponents of LGBT
litigants sifting through Alabama court opinions in search of cases
hostile to homosexuality and/or LGBT parents. They go directly to
Ex parte H.H., having heard that its holding and reasoning will
support their cause. They will be disappointed, because they will find
that Chief Justice Moore wrote alone, and an honest reading of the
majority opinion will reveal that it stands only for an unremarkable
point of appellate procedure.57 Perhaps this is why Chief Justice
(recognizing unions between men and women only); S.C. C ODE ANN . § 20-1-15 (L:aw.
Co-op 1996) (declaring same-sex marriages against state policy). The state and
federal constitutionality of such anti-marriage statutes has been and likely will
continue to be vigorously contested. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex
Marriage, Choice of Law, and Public Policy, 76 T EX. L. R EV. 921 (1998); Melissa
Rothstein, The Defense of Marriage Act and Federalism: A States Rights Argument in Defense
of Same-Sex Marriages, 31 F AM. L.Q. 571 (1997); Scott Ruskay-Kidd, Note, The Defense of
Marriage Act and the Overextension of Congressional Authority, 97 C OLUM. L. R EV. 1435
(1997). For commentary opposing same-sex marriages, see generally for example,
Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Same-Sex Marriages and the Defense of Marriage Act: A Deviant View
of an Experiment in Full Faith and Credit, 32 C REIGHTON L. R EV. 409 (1998); Lynn
Wardle, Williams v. North Carolina, Divorce Recognition, and Same-Sex Marriage
Recognition, 32 C REIGHTON L. R EV. 187 (1998); Ralph U. Whitten, The Original
Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32
C REIGHTON L. R EV. 255 (1998).
53. See ALA. C ODE § 30-1-19 (1975).
54. See Ex parte D.W.W., 717 So. 2d 793, 796 (Ala. 1998) (reviewing a very
restrictive visitation arrangement imposed upon a lesbian mother by Judge Roy
Moore, Circuit Court, Etowah County). Interestingly, only one Alabama Supreme
Court justice signed onto this opinion. See id. Two justices (including Justice
Houston, the author of the Ex parte H.H. majority opinion) concurred in the result
and two dissented. See id.; see also Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998)
(quoting Ex parte D.W.W. to support denial of custody to lesbian mother on the basis
of her sexual orientation). These cases are rich with examples of judicial bias on the
basis of sexual orientation. For a fuller analysis, see Elizabeth Erin Bosquet,
Contextualizing and Analyzing Alabamas Approach to Gay and Lesbian Custody Rights, 51
ALA. L. R EV. 1625 (2000).
55. Canon 3 of the Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics forbids  personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party, but specific characteristics such as sexual orientation
are not enumerated. See ALA. C ANONS OF JUD . E THICS 3(c)(1)(a) (1999).
56. See Ex parte H.H., No. 1002045, 2002 Ala. LEXIS 44, at *10-*11 (Feb. 15,
2002) (refusing to affirm the Court of Civil Appeals opinion for  impermissibly
reweighing evidence).
TM
for the majority opinion do not even
57. For example, West  Keynotes
mention homosexuality. See generally Ex parte H.H., 2002 WL 227956 (Ala. Feb. 15,
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Moore felt so strongly compelled to write his opinion.
As William Duncan suggests in this symposium, Chief Justice
Moore may accurately describe the Alabama courts historical
58
But Chief Justice Moore describes
hostility to homosexuality.
another aspect of Alabama law that is crucial here; he writes that  it is
within a trial courts discretion to determine that the homosexual
conduct and relationship of a parent . . . is detrimental to the
59
children. Chief Justice Moore himself makes clear that a judges
decision regarding a parents sexual orientation is a discretionary
one; nothing in Alabama law, hostile though it may be, requires a
judge in a custody case to consider or condemn a parents
60
homosexuality. Thus, moments of choice arrive at trial (when the
judge originally exercises discretion) and on appeal (as judges review
that exercise of discretion). These judges choose whether or not a
litigants sexual orientation will be treated as a neutral factor or, in
contrast, as an opportunity to deliver page upon page of
inflammatory screed against homosexuality.
The majority and concurring opinions in Ex parte H.H. illustrate
this contrast. The majoritys holding rests upon an unremarkable
61
Granted, the mothers
principle of appellate procedure.
homosexuality was a fact presented to and considered by the trial
court, and the Alabama Supreme Court declined to disentangle that
record in an effort to ensure that she was not penalized for her sexual
orientation. True, the court did not explicitly repudiate Chief Justice
Moores summary of Alabama law or in any way condemn his
inflammatory rhetoric. From my perspective, certainly, the majority
opinion in Ex parte H.H. could be better.
But then again, it could have been much worse. Chief Justice
Moore demonstrates this as he consumes thirty-five pages to explain
why, in his view, homosexuality is  detestable, an  abominable sin,
 abhorrent,  immoral,  an inherent evil, and  inherently
62
destructive to the natural order of society. Although Chief Justice
2002).
58. See Duncan, supra note 4, at 97.
59. Ex parte H.H., 2002 Ala. LEXIS 44, at *16-*17 (Moore, C.J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
60. See Brown, supra note 3, at 424 (noting that discretionary standards such as
 the best interest of the child give judges a choice and arguing that  [i]f a judge
need not rule against a litigant on the basis of sexual orientation, then Canon 3
demands that judges rule on this basis only when they are certain that the ruling
does not stem from bias. ).
61. See Ex parte H.H., 2002 Ala. LEXIS 44, at *10-*11 (focusing on whether the
Court of Civil Appeals impermissibly reweighed the evidence submitted at trial).
62. Id. at *45 (Moore, C.J., concurring).
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Moore describes  homosexual behavior as  an act so heinous that it
63
defies ones ability to describe it, his thirty-plus page opinion
suggests that he was not unduly daunted by this challenge. The
rhetoric fairly sputters with hostility and moral indignation toward
64
behavior that is constitutive of a litigants identity as a lesbian. In
the face of such patent animosity, calling this language
 disrespectful seems a ridiculous understatement.
In a passing flash of good sense, Chief Justice Moore argues that
 judges should not make decisions based on the latest psychological
or sociological study or statistical poll, the interpretations of which
are subject to the bias and philosophical leanings of the researchers
65
I am
and which are subject to being refuted by other studies.
inclined to agree with Chief Justice Moores skepticism about the
usefulness of social scientific data about homosexuality, but my
answer is to focus on the evidence regarding the individual LGBT
66
litigants before the court, rather than to fall back on what Moore
67
calls  fixed principles. He disregards his own sage advice about
social scientific data, moreover, when he drops a page-long footnote
(complete with explanatory parentheticals) citing several studies that
find a greater incidence of emotional and psychiatric disorders
68
among LGBT populations. If social scientific studies are suspect,
one might ask the point of reproducing such findings in a judicial
opinion. It seems Chief Justice Moore cannot resist the opportunity
to cite studies he deems consistent with his view of homosexuality as
pathology. This is positive bias, for it reflects a distortion in the way
Chief Justice Moore perceives and describes the litigants in the case
63. Id. at *43 (Moore, C.J., concurring).
64. See Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 865 (2002) ( The shift from
burdening homosexual status to burdening homosexual sodomy is not much of a
shift because sodomy is at least partially constitutive of gay identity. ).
65. Ex parte H.H., 2002 Ala. LEXIS 44, at *39-*40 (Moore, C.J., concurring)
(citations omitted).
66. Brown, supra note 3, at 411 ( [W]hen clear and reliable evidence specific to a
gay or lesbian litigant exists in a case, it should never be trumped by group
statistics. ).
67. Ex parte H.H., 2002 Ala. LEXIS 44, at *39-*40 (Moore, C.J., concurring)
(contending that judges should not make decisions based on psychological or
sociological studies which can be subject to bias or later refuted through additional
studies).
68. Moore notes the argument that societal condemnation causes this higher
incidence of mental illness rather than something inherent in homosexuality, but he
says it is  contradicted by a study showing a higher incidence of mental health
problems among LGBT people in the Netherlands. See id. at *42. He assumes that
because recent Dutch law has been particularly progressive on gay rights, LGBT
people in the Netherlands do not suffer indeed, have never suffered 
discrimination or societal condemnation on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. This
assumption is far fetched.
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before him.
If a judicial opinion even one as inflammatory as Chief Justice
Moores were compelled by statute, regulation, or binding
precedent, it would be insulated from discipline. As Chief Justice
Moore himself acknowledges, however, considering a parents sexual
orientation in custody disputes is within a judges discretion; it is not
mandatory. Even if it were mandatory, nothing in the law would
require the many pages of hostility Chief Justice Moore chose to pour
forth. The issue in the case was a procedural one: was the evidentiary
basis for the trial courts ruling sufficient, and was the appellate court
69
wrong to reweigh that evidence, especially the oral testimony? Chief
Justice Moore apparently agreed with the majoritys opinion on this
70
controlling, procedural issue. The decision to spend thirty pages in
this case decrying homosexuality was driven by Chief Justice Moores
obvious hostility to homosexuality, not by Alabama law. To the
extent Chief Justice Moore focused on the issue at hand, the standard
71
of appellate review, his opinion duplicated the majoritys. To the
extent he went beyond that procedural issue, his opinion was
72
gratuitous and beside the point.
In defense of his opinion, Chief Justice Moore has argued that  a
person is never biased by abiding by the law, and  the law in
73
Alabama says that sodomy is against the law. When a judge  abides
by law that is not relevant to or binding upon the issue at hand,
however, bias can seep into the proceedings, particularly when the
judge is abiding by non-binding law that systematically disadvantages
a discrete group of litigants.
II. C ANON 3 DOES NOT R EQUIRE F AVORING LGBT L ITIGANTS ON THE
BASIS OF SEXUAL O RIENTATION
In his essay for this symposium, William Duncan acknowledges that
the reach of Canon 3 probably requires more than civility from
judges, extending perhaps as far as judges fact finding and
74
evidentiary rulings. He takes issue with my insistence that judges
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at *1.
Id. at *16 (Moore, C.J., concurring).
Id.
Even the lawyer for the father in the case acknowledged after the ruling that
Moores concurring opinion did not reflect the views of the majority of the court and
was  not the central issue in this case. Keith, supra note 25.
73. Chief Justice Roy Moore Speaks Out on Gays, ASSOC. PRESS, Mar. 24, 2002 (on file
with the American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law ).
74. See Duncan, supra note 4, at 90-92.
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can manifest bias and violate Canon 3 when they interpret and apply
75
the law. He argues that we go too far if we attempt to subject
76
normative bias to discipline. The mode of argument he employs is
fascinating, but ultimately misleading.
In an effort to explore the continuum along which types of bias
might lie, he suggests two categories of behavior that he believes
might legitimately be prohibited by Canon 3:  name calling and
77
To discuss whether the
 irrelevant notice of sexual orientation.
reach of Canon 3 might extend beyond these behaviors, Mr. Duncan
considers two normative standards that might be intended by Canon
78
3:  preference for homosexual litigants and  bias provision as
79
constitutional standard. First, I find it interesting that Mr. Duncan
places upon his  continuum four elements that are not really
parallel. Within the reach of Canon 3 he endorses, Mr. Duncan is
able to describe judicial behavior that would run afoul of Canon 3
80
For the points on the so called
and be subject to discipline.
continuum that lie outside his approved reach of Canon 3, on the
other hand, he chooses not to describe judicial behavior that would
81
run afoul of the standard.
Second, I am aware of no court or commentator advocating
 preference for homosexual litigants as the standard for avoiding
imputations of bias or prejudice under Canon 3. In my earlier work
on Canon 3, I consistently argued that avoiding sexual orientation
bias requires judges to be  orientation neutral, treating
82
homosexuality and heterosexuality as legally and morally equal. Mr.
Duncan and I might have honest disagreements about what is
required for a judge to be orientation neutral; treatment I would
perceive as  fair to an LGBT litigant might seem preferential to Mr.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 92-94.
See id.
Id. at 90-92.
Id. at 92-93.
See id. at 93.
See id. at 90-92.
81. This lack of parallelism is what I sought to avoid when I described the reach
of Canon 3 consistently in terms of judicial behavior that would run afoul of it.
Brown, supra note 3, at 370.
82. See id. at 392 ( Perhaps it would be helpful for judges to adopt the same
approach they take to heterosexual litigants: most judges can accept that a straight
person might be sexually active without allowing the persons sexuality to
overshadow all other aspects of his or her identity ); see also id. at 426 ( Canon 3
merely requires that when judges apply discretionary standards, the factors they
consider should be orientation-neutral equally applicable to heterosexual and
homosexual parents. ).
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Duncan, especially if the court upheld an LGBT litigants rights at the
expense of a heterosexual person. For example, treatment I would
characterize as  fair to a lesbian mother in a custody dispute might
cause her heterosexual ex-spouse to get less time with their children.
Because the husband has something to lose if we start to dismantle
83
the heterosexual privilege that gives him certain advantages, it is
tempting to let those potential losses loom larger than the
corresponding potential gain to the mother, who currently suffers
sexual orientation bias. This is only to say that  fairness and
 partiality are often in the eye of the beholder.
The closest I have come to advocating an approach that gives
LGBT litigants treatment different from heterosexual litigants relates
to laws that have a disparate impact on LGBT litigants. For example,
judges in custody disputes might use marriage as a factor which, on
its face, appears orientation-neutral, arguing that they are seeking to
protect children not from homosexuality per se but rather from
extramarital sex. Because people are not permitted to marry
members of their own sex, however, this factor would clearly
disadvantage gay people. Thus, in a custody case, a judge could rule
against a gay man in a committed, long-term relationship with
another man, granting the mans ex-wife greater access to the
children because she has taken the opportunity to marry a new male
partner. When a factor such as the opportunity to commit to a
relationship through marriage has so clear a disparate impact, judges
might exercise some care about using this factor to the detriment of
84
gay and lesbian litigants.
Again, it is important that we are
contemplating judicial decision-making under broadly discretionary
standards. If a judge is not required to use a factor like marriage, the
judge might avoid doing so in ways that would predictably
disadvantage LGBT litigants, focusing instead on factors that are
more truly orientation neutral.
Even this caveat falls far short of advocating a  preference for
homosexual litigants. Since no one appears to be advocating such a
83. As Professor Bruce Ryder argues,  What heterosexism gives straight men and
women, what it takes away from lesbians and gays, is heterosexual privilege. Bruce
Ryder, Straight Talk: Male Heterosexual Privilege, 16 QUEENS L.J. 287, 290 (1991).
84. See Brown, supra note 3, at 426 n.269 (explaining that same-sex relationships
are at a disadvantage when courts attempt to protect children from extramarital sex
because of the fact that same-sex partners are not permitted to marry). Cf. Burns v.
Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 48 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (visitation consent order provided  no
visitation nor residence by the children with either party during any time where such
party cohabits with or has overnight stays with any adult to which such party is not
legally married ). The mother failed to satisfy this condition by entering into a
Vermont civil union with her female partner. Id. at 602

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol11/iss1/6

14

Brown: Adjudication According to Codes of Judicial Conduct
ADJUDICATION ACCORDING T O C ODES O F JUDICIAL C ONDUCT

2002]

11/20/02 4:14 PM

ADJUDICATION AND C ODES OF JUDICIAL C ONDUCT

81

standard, one wonders why Mr. Duncan includes it on his
 continuum. A possible answer emerges as he moves on to discuss
the next point on the continuum,  bias provision as constitutional
85
I have argued in earlier work that Canon 3 might
standard.
supplement or illuminate rational basis review of classifications based
86
on sexual orientation. Such an approach, Mr. Duncan writes, falls
 even further from the traditional understanding of the reach of bias
87
than  preference for homosexual litigants.
provisions
 Preference for homosexual litigants thus appears on Mr. Duncans
88
continuum as a kind of rhetorical marker. It seems clearly wrong to
suggest that we can remedy bias in the courts by displacing
preferences for heterosexual litigants with preferences for LGBT
litigants. Such a position would advocate a new form of bias on the
basis of sexual orientation one that admittedly promotes rather
than suppresses the interests of LGBT litigants, but nonetheless
would inject a new form of bias into proceedings.
But treating Canon 3 as a supplement to constitutional protections
for LGBT litigants does not lie beyond this rhetorical marker; it is
wholly consistent with traditional notions of judicial neutrality. In
89
Romer v. Evans, the U.S. Supreme Court held that governments must
show that classifications based on sexual orientation are rationally
empirically related to legitimate purposes (purposes that cannot be
90
driven by bare hostility toward homosexuality per se). Romer gives
reason to hope that classifications based on sexual orientation may
91
start to receive more than  rubber-stamp review . But even if Romer
does not consistently receive the robust reading set forth above,
Canon 3s prohibition of normative bias might address some of the
discrimination that would fall between the constitutional cracks. As I
have argued in earlier work,  Canon 3 might offer a nonconstitutional constraint that would more rigorously prevent judges
from ruling against gay and lesbian litigants on the basis of distaste
85. Duncan, supra note 4, at 93.
86. See Brown, supra note 3, at 436-40.
87. Duncan, supra note 4, at 93.
88.  If you think preference for homosexual litigants is zany, he seems to say,
 just get a load of this constitutional stuff! Of course Mr. Duncan is too dignified a
scholar (and too nice a guy) to put the argument in quite these terms. See id. at 9293.
89. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
90. See id. at 632-33 ( [W]e insist on knowing the relation between the
classification adopted and the object to be attained . . .[to ensure that] classifications
are not drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law. ).
91. See Brown, supra note 3, at 437 (proclaiming that Canon 3 will establish
greater scrutiny during appeals).
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for or moral condemnation of homosexuality per se. To claim that
a personal characteristic enumerated in Canon 3 is morally inferior
seems a straightforward example of  bias or  prejudice forbidden
by Canon 3. Thus,  Canon 3 might supplement Romer by eliminating
93
a broader range of normative rationales for anti-gay rulings.
C ONCLUSION
In conclusion, Ill suggest another way in which Canon 3 might
supplement constitutional protections for LGBT litigants: flexible
penalties. In an earlier work, I argued that discipline under Canon 3
could fill in when biased judges escape or grow inured to reversal on
94
This suggests that Canon 3 could increase the sting of
appeal.
penalties inflicted on biased judges. It is also possible, however, that
Canon 3 could provide a more incremental, progressive mechanism
for dealing with judicial bias. Rather than relying exclusively upon
reversal to maintain the quality of judicial decision making, discipline
under Canon 3 would permit a broader array of remedies. For mild
or first-time manifestations of bias, judicial inquiry boards might
simply issue a private reprimand, letting biased judges know that
their peers do not approve of their actions. For more egregious
examples of bias or for repeat offenders, public censure might be
necessary to restore the publics confidence in the neutrality of the
bench. Finally, disqualification, suspension, and even impeachment
could be deployed in the most serious cases, when judicial inquiry
boards need to temporarily or permanently incapacitate biased
judges. The graduated nature of the penalties available through
disciplinary proceedings suggests that discipline need not be an  all
or nothing proposition; it can guide judges toward greater neutrality
in their decision-making without publicly shaming them in all cases.95
In the long run, the best way to curb judicial bias on the basis of
sexual orientation is through education and dialogue. But some
judges may need to know that penalties can escalate if private
discussions and reprimands go unheeded. The range of remedies
available through Canon 3 and the disciplinary proceedings it
92. Id. at 436-37.
93. Id. at 437.
94. See id. at 441-44 (recognizing that the appellate process will not be a complete
check on orientation bias; a judges disrespect to the litigant and the system may
require disciplinary action).
95. Similarly, John Braithwaite proposes a response to offenses that begins with
dialogue and collaboration, and if necessary escalates to deterrence and
incapacitation. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE, R ESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND R ESPONSIVE
R EGULATION 65 (2002).
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triggers allow this more nuanced response to judicial bias on the basis
of sexual orientation.
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